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The Status of Natural or Legal Persons According to the 
Annulment Procedure Post-Lisbon 
Magdalena Kucko* 
ABSTRACT 
In 2007, the Lisbon Treaty introduced changes to private parties’ rights to file actions for 
annulment of European Union measures. As pre-Lisbon, it was exceedingly difficult for 
private parties to succeed in filing such an action, the aim of the new Article 263 TFEU was 
primarily to relax standing conditions for these actors. However, as the new provision contained 
terms that were not defined anywhere else in the Treaty, it took several decisions of the 
European Court of Justice to clarify the position of private parties under Lisbon. By analysing 
both the pre- and post- Lisbon case law of the European Court of Justice, this article identifies 
that the new Article 263 TFEU now contains two different standing tests: the ‘general 
standing test’ for legislative acts where applicants have to prove direct and individual concern, 
and the ‘Lisbon test’ of direct concern for regulatory acts that do not contain implementing 
measures. It concludes that, while the Lisbon Treaty has made it easier for natural or legal 
persons to challenge non-legislative acts of general application, the status of private parties 
wishing to challenge European Union acts that have been adopted under the ordinary 
legislative procedure has remained unchanged. 
INTRODUCTION 
Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms lays down the fundamental right to an effective legal remedy. This 
right has furthermore been included in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
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the European Union,1 and because of its importance, it has also found its way 
into the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).2  
As the European Union (EU) develops its policy through regulations, 
directives and decisions, it can effectively be regarded as having a fully 
functioning legal system. It is vital for an institution with such pervasive 
legislative power to contain a mechanism for testing the legality of its measures, 
and the principal TFEU provision through which this can be done is the 
annulment procedure codified in Article 263 TFEU.3 
Apart from providing European institutions with the right to challenge the 
legality of EU acts, Article 263 TFEU also grants natural and legal persons, i.e. 
the so-called ‘non-privileged’ applicants listed in Article 263(4) TFEU, the right 
to file actions for annulment. According to Article 263(4) TFEU, non-privileged 
applicants are only allowed to bring an annulment action if they are either (1) 
addressees of the act; (2) the act in question is of direct and individual concern 
to them; or (3) against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and 
does not entail implementing measures.  
The Lisbon Treaty introduced the aforementioned third type of case in 
which private parties can bring an action for annulment by removing the 
requirement for individual concern when it comes to challenging regulatory acts 
which do not entail implementing measures.4 Pre-Lisbon, private parties could 
traditionally only challenge acts to which they were not addressees if they were 
able to prove ‘direct and individual concern’ – and it was the requirement of 
individual concern as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(the Court) that made it ‘exceedingly difficult’ for them to prove their locus standi 
pursuant to the old Article 230 EC.5 Namely, in the Plaumann ruling from the 
early 1960s, the Court developed a highly restrictive test for establishing a 
private party’s individual concern.6 The Plaumann formula, which will inter alia be 
discussed in this paper, has been severely criticised for making economically 
* Current LLM student at the London School of Economics and Political Sciences.
1 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2000] OJ C 364/01, Art. 44. 
2 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] 
OJ C 326 (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union), Art. 263. 
3 ibid art 289; Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials, (6th 
edn, OUP 2015) 509. 
4 Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community [2007] OJ C 306/1, Art. 214. 
5 L Neville Brown and Tom Kennedy, The Court of Justice of the European Communities, (5th 
edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2000) 146. 
6 Case 25/62 Plaumann & Co v Commission [1963] ECR 95. 
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arbitrary distinctions and for favouring private interests over public ones.7 Even 
though some attempts were made to alleviate the threshold set by Plaumann, the 
formula has remained unchanged until present time.8 It was nevertheless the aim 
of the Lisbon Treaty to, as the Court put it, ‘relax’ the admissibility conditions 
of the annulment action for natural and legal persons by removing the 
requirement of individual concern for regulatory acts that do not contain 
implementing measures.9 Unfortunately, the wording of the new provision does 
not provide us with much clarity, as the precise meaning of both the term 
‘regulatory act’ and the expression ‘act which does not contain implementing 
measures’ has not been defined in the Lisbon Treaty.  
 In this article, I offer an interpretation of the status of natural or legal 
persons according to the new Article 263 TFEU as enacted by the Lisbon 
Treaty. The paper will seek to answer the question as to whether the new 
provision has successfully managed to make it easier for private parties to file an 
action for annulment of a EU measure. In order to do so, it will first provide a 
brief explanation of Article 263 TFEU itself. Then, the pre-Lisbon status of 
natural or legal persons will be analysed by looking at the old Treaty Articles and 
case law. Finally, in order to reach a conclusion as to the post-Lisbon status of 
private parties, the meaning of the new provision will be explained in the light 
of recent cases.  
 
I. ARTICLE 263 TFEU 
 
Article 263 TFEU gives the Court the power to review the legality of acts of 
European institutions such as the Council, Commission and the European 
Central Bank (ECB) other than recommendations and opinions. Acts of the 
European Parliament (Parliament), the European Council and other EU bodies, 
offices or agencies can also be reviewed, but only if they are intended to 
produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties.  
 Pursuant to Article 263(2) TFEU, there are four grounds on the basis of 
which the aforementioned acts can be annulled, namely lack of competence, 
infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the 
Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their application, and misuse of power.  
	
	
7 Damian Chalmers, Gareth Davies and Giogio Monti, European Union Law, (2nd edn, 
CUP 2010) 397. 
8 Case C-50/00 Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council [2002] ECR I-6677; Case C-263/02 
Commission v Jégo-Quéré & Cie SA [2004] ECR I-3425. 
9 Case C-132/12 Stichting Woonpunt v Commission [2014] ECR EU:C:2014:100, para. 43. 
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 Article 263(2) TFEU stipulates that an action for annulment can be 
brought by Member States, the Parliament, the Council or the Commission. 
Given the absence of any words of limitation, it is clear that these applicants 
have unlimited standing to challenge a measure – they are the so-called 
‘privileged’ applicants who are always allowed to bring actions for annulment.10 
The Court of Auditors, the ECB and the Committee of Regions – the ‘semi-
privileged’ applicants – are mentioned in Article 263(3) TFEU, which gives 
them standing only to protect their own institutional prerogatives.11 
 As mentioned above, 263(4) TFEU also grants natural or legal persons the 
right to file actions for annulment. They may do so under the conditions laid 
down in Article 263(1) and (2) TFEU, meaning that they can only seek to annul 
acts enacted by one of the institutions listed in Article 263(1) TFEU and only on 
the basis of one of the grounds mentioned in Article 263(2) TFEU.  
 Furthermore, all applicants must adhere to the time limit of two months 
after publication of the measure in question set in Article 263(6) TFEU.12  
 If an annulment action is well-founded, the Court will declare the act void 
according to Article 264 TFEU, even though it is possible that only part of the 
measure will be affected by the illegality ruling.13 Nullity is retroactive, thus an 
act annulled under Article 264 TFEU is considered as having been void ab 
initio,14 and such a ruling has an effect erga omnes by binding all national courts in 
the EU.15 
 
II. PRE-LISBON SITUATION 
 
The EEC and EC Articles  
	
	
10 Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca (n 3) 514; Chalmers, Davies and Monti (n 7) 413, 
397. 
11 Damian Chalmers, Gareth Davies and Giorgio Monti (n 7) 397. 
12 Cases C-478/11 - C482/11 Gbagbo e.a. v Council [2013] ECR EU:C:2013:258. 
13 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Art. 264(2). 
14 Case C-228/92 Roquette Frères SA v Hauptzollant Geldern [1994] ECR I-1445, para. 17; 
Cases T-481 and 484/93 Vereniging van Exporteurs in Levende Varkens v Commission [1995] 
ECR II-2941, para 46; Case T-171/99 Corus UK Ltd v Commission [2001] ECR II-2967, 
para. 50. 
15 Case 66/80 International Chemical Corporation v Amministrazione delle Finanze [1981] ECR 
1191; AG Toth, ‘The Authority of Judgments of the European Court of Justice: Binding 
Force and Legal Effects’ (1984) 4  Yearbook of European Law 1, 49. 
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The right of natural and legal persons to file an action for annulment was first 
enshrined in Article 173(2) of the Treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community (EEC). Article 173(1) EEC gave the Court the competence to 
review acts ‘other than recommendations or opinions of the Council and 
Commission’. It then went on to mention Member States, the European 
Council and the European Commission as applicants who can file appeals on 
the grounds of ‘incompetence, of errors in substantial form, of infringement of 
the Treaty or of any legal provision relating to its application, or of abuse of 
power’.  
Article 173(2) EEC provides that ‘[a]ny natural or legal person may, under 
the same conditions, appeal against a decision which, although in the form of a 
regulation or a decision addressed to another person, is of direct and individual 
concern to him.’ 
With the entry into force of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community (EC), the annulment procedure was codified in Article 230 EC. 
There were no substantial changes in the wording of the Article, except that 
now acts of the European Parliament and the ECB could also be subject to 
review by the Court. The European Parliament was given the status of 
privileged applicant together with the Member States, Council and Commission, 
while the Court of Auditors and the ECB could now file actions for annulment 
as semi-privileged applicants under Article 230(3) EC.  
Article 230(4) EC read as follows: 
Any natural or legal person may, under the same conditions, 
institute proceedings against a decision addressed to that person 
or against a decision which, although in the form of a regulation 
or a decision addressed to another person, is of direct and 
individual concern to the former.  
Thus, prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 
2009, it was only possible for private parties to bring an action for annulment 
against EEC/EC measures that were of ‘direct and individual’ concern to them. 
The exact meaning of these terms was provided by the Court and will be 
discussed now.  
 
Direct Concern 
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As historically, individual concern has been the greater obstacle to locus standi for 
non-privileged applicants, the case law on direct concern has remained limited. 
This may change in the future, as when it comes to regulatory acts enshrined in 
the new Article 263 TFEU, the test of individual concern has been removed, 
meaning that for this type of measures the direct concern test is the only 
requirement that private parties need to satisfy. More jurisprudence on this 
matter is therefore to be expected.16 
 Direct concern has two dimensions. Firstly, there needs to be a direct, 
causal link between the act that is being challenged and the damage the applicant 
has suffered. This essentially means that the measure must directly affect the 
legal situation of the applicant and no discretion is to be left to the addressees of 
the measure entrusted with its implementation.17 The implementation must be 
‘purely’ automatic and result directly from EU rules – no other transitional rules 
can apply.18 If a margin of discretion is left to national authorities with regard to 
the implementation of a measure, the chain of causation will be broken, as in 
such a situation it can be argued that it is in fact the national measure that 
caused damage to the applicant. As was illustrated in cases such as the 
International Fruit Case and Differdange, in order to establish potential discretion, 
the Court will look whether the EU act at hand affords any leeway. 19 Apart 
from this, it is vital to ascertain whether in practice, this discretion will actually 
be exercised by national authorities. For example, in Piraiki-Pitraki, the Court 
ruled that after having obtained Commission authorisation to continue a pre-
existing regime restricting cotton imports from Greece, ‘there was no more than 
a theoretical possibility’ that France would not proceed in applying it. Therefore, 
the Commission authorisation legalising the national regime in question directly 
concerned the Greek cotton exporters who had sought to annul it.20 
 Secondly, the interest affected by the EU measure in question must be of 
legal nature. If the measure infringes on a particular interest that has not been 
recognised by the Court as a legally protected interest, the applicant in question 
will not be able to prove direct concern.21 The Front National decision provides 
us with a good example of the Court’s approach in this respect. The issue in this 
case was that a number of independent MEPs, including several members of the 
	
	
16 Damian Chalmers, Gareth Davies and Giorgio Monti (n 7) 415. 
17 ibid 416; Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca (n 3) 515. 
18 Case T-29/03 BUPA and Others v Commission [2008] ECR II-81; Case 69/69 Alcan v 
Commission [1970] ECR 385; Case C-386/96 Société Louis Dreyfus & Cie v Commission [1998] 
ECR I-2309. 
19 Cases 41-44 NV International Fruit Company v Commission [1971] ECR 411; Case 222/83 
Municipality of Differdange v Commission [1984] ECR 2889. 
20 Case 11/82 Piraiki-Pitraki v Commission [1985] ECR 207. 
21 Damian Chalmers, Gareth Davies and Giorgio Monti (n 7) 417. 
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French far-right political party Front National, did not belong to any political 
group in the Parliament. The MEPs attempted to establish a mixed ‘TDI’ group 
but Parliament refused to grant it group status. This decision was then 
challenged both by the independent MEPs individually and the Front National 
itself. Front National was held not to have direct concern because no legal right 
was directly infringed by the Parliament’s act: Front National had no legal right 
to form its own group or to join another group.22 
 
Individual Concern 
 
The Plaumann Formula 
 
The second part of the test that individual applicants had to pass is that of 
individual concern as defined in Plaumann. In 1961, the German authorities 
requested Commission authorisation for suspension of collection of duties on 
clementines imported from non-member states. The Commission refused to 
grant authorisation and addressed its refusal to the German Government. The 
applicant, an importer of clementines, contested the legality of the 
Commission’s decision. As the decision had not been addressed directly to Mr 
Plaumann, he had to demonstrate individual concern, but the Court ruled that 
that the applicant had no locus standi. In doing so, it developed a formula that 
would remain in use until the present day.  
 According to the decision in Plaumann:  
[P]ersons other than those to whom a decision is addressed may 
only claim to be individually concerned if that decision affects 
them by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or 
by reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from 
all other persons and by virtue of these factors distinguishes them 
individually just as in the case of the person addressed’.23  
It is necessary that these attributes or circumstances are fixed and 
determinate and that they distinguish members from the rest.24  
	
	
22 Case C-486/01 Front National v European Parliament [2004] ECR I-6289. See also Case 
C-15/06 Regione Siciliana v Commission [2007] ECR I-2591. 
23 Case 25/62 Plaumann & Co v Commission [1963] ECR 95. 
24 Damian Chalmers, Gareth Davies and Giorgio Monti (n 7) 418. 
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 When applying the Plaumann test that will determine whether this is the 
case, regard must be had as to whether, at any certain date in the future, there is 
a possibility that the group in question will no longer be fixed and determinate.25 
In Plaumann, the Court effectively adopted this test by ruling that any of us 
could, in theory, become clementine importers in the future, and that therefore, 
Mr. Plaumann could not be distinguished from others.  
 In this respect, one could also make a distinction between open and closed 
(‘fixed’) categories of applicants. A category can be regarded as an open one 
when its membership has not been fixed at the time of the decision. A closed 
category is one where membership is thus fixed. Individual concern can only be 
claimed in this second case.26 
 
The Plaumann Formula: Regulations and Directives 
 
In Plaumann, an action for annulment was filed against a decision addressed to 
another. However, pre-Lisbon, there were also cases in which applicants tried to 
prove individual concern for legal acts that took the form of a regulation or 
directive. While the text of the old Article 230(4) EC was ambiguous as to 
whether private parties could challenge the validity of regulations or directives, 
prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Court had established that 
such persons could in principle challenge the legality of a directive. Still, the 
applicant had to satisfy the strict Plaumann requirement of individual concern.27 
 When it comes to challenging regulations, the pre-Lisbon situation was 
more complicated. Initially, there were two tests in case law: the closed category 
test and the abstract terminology test.28 Eventually, the Court adopted the 
stricter abstract terminology test as exemplified in Calpak and a number of other 
judgments.29 According to Calpak, a regulation could be regarded as a ‘true 
	
	
25 Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca (n 3) 520. 
26 Trevor C. Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law: An Introduction to the 
Constitutional and Administrative Law of the European Community (6th edn, OUP 2007) 348; see 
also Case C-519/07 Commission v Koninklijke FrieslandCampina NV [2009] ECR I-8495. 
27 Case C-298/89 Gibraltar v Council [1993] ECR I-3605; Case T-135/96 UEAPME v 
Council [1998] ECR II-2335; Case T-94/04 EEB v Commission [2005] ECR II-4919. 
28 Closed category: see Cases 41-44/70 NV International Fruit Company v Commission [1971] 
ECR 411; Case 100/74 Société CAM SA v Commission [1975] ECR 1393; Case C-354/87 
Weddel v Commission [1990] ECR I-3487. 
29 Cases 789 and 790/79 Calpak SpA and Società Emiliana Lavorazione Frutta SpA v 
Commission [1980] ECR 1949; Cases 103-109/78 Beauport v Council and Commission [1979] 
ECR 17; Case 162/78 Wagner v Commission [1979] ECR 3467; Case 45/81 Alexander 
Moksel Import-Export GmbH & Co Handels KG v Commission [1982] ECR 1129. 
2017] LSE LAW REVIEW  
	
	
109 
regulation’ only if it applied to ‘objectively determined situations and if it 
produced legal effects with regard to categories of persons described in a 
generalised and abstract manner’.30 If a regulation was found to be a ‘true 
regulation’ then the Court would conclude that the applicant was not 
individually concerned. 31 
 However, in Cordoniu the Court overturned this position by ruling that 
even if, upon application of the abstract terminology test, a regulation was to be 
regarded as a ‘true regulation’, it could nevertheless be of individual concern to 
the applicant.32 Just as in the case of directives, the applicant then had to satisfy 
the Plaumann test. It can thus be said that the dominant approach of the Court 
post-Cordoniu was ‘pure Plaumann’.33 
 
Criticism and Attempts to Change the Plaumann  Doctrine 
 
The Plaumann test provoked much discussion in the literature, most of it 
critical.34 The main concerns about the Plaumann formula were that the wording 
of the Treaty did not satisfy such a strict standing test, and that it essentially 
prevented private parties from exercising their right to judicial redress. From 
this, it followed that the right to effective remedy was not sufficiently 
guaranteed in the EU legal system.35 
	
	
30 Cases 789 and 790/79 Calpak SpA and Società Emiliana Lavorazione Frutta SpA v 
Commission [1980] ECR 1949, para. 9. 
31 John Tillotson and Nigel Foster, Text, Cases and Materials on European Union Law (4th 
edn, Cavendish Publishing Limited 2004) 515. 
32 Case C-309/89 Cordoniu SA v Council [1994] ECR I-1853.  
33 Exceptions to ‘pure Plaumann’: Cases T-480 and 483/93 Antillean Rice Mills NV v 
Commission [1995] ECR II-2305; Cases T-32 and 41/98 Government of the Netherlands Antilles 
v Commission [2000] ECR II-20; Case T-33/01 Infront WM AG v Commission [2005] ECR 
II-5897. 
34 Angela Ward, ‘Locus Standi Under Article 230(4) of the EC Treaty: Crafting a 
Coherent Test for a Wobbly Polity’ (2003) 22 Yearbook of European Law 45; Anthony 
Arnull, ‘Private Applicants and the Action for Annulment Since Codorniu’ (2001) 38 
Common Market Law Review 7; X Lewis, ‘Standing of Private Plaintiffs to Annul 
Generally Applicable European Community Measures: If the System is Broken, Where 
Should it be Fixed?’ (2006) 30 Fordham International Law Journal 5. 
35 Ami Barav, ‘Direct and Individual Concern: An Almost Insurmountable Barrier to the 
Admissibility of Individual Appeal to the EEC Court’ (1974) 11 Common Market Law 
Review 1; Anthony Arnull, ‘Private Applicants and the Action for Annulment since 
Cordoniu’ (2001) 38 Common Market Law Review 7; Koen Lenaerts and Tim Corthaut, 
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 Throughout the years, the Court defended its controversial rulings on the 
ground that applicants who did not have locus standi under Article 230 EC could 
always seek judicial protection by indirectly challenging a measure in national 
courts as provided for in Article 234 EC (now 267 TFEU). It has been argued 
that it was mainly the Court’s fear of opening the floodgates to litigation, 
together with a desire not to obstruct the EC institutions in their task of 
implementing Community policies, which led to such a limitative interpretation 
of first Article 173 EEC and later Article 230 EC.36 
 In Extramet, Advocate General Jacobs devoted several paragraphs of his 
Opinion to questioning the Court’s reasoning.37 However, his biggest attack on 
the Plaumann formula would come later, in Unión de Pequeños Agricultores (UPA). 
This case concerned a Spanish trade association representing small agricultural 
producers who challenged a Council regulation which discontinued certain types 
of agricultural aid for small producers. Under the Plaumann test, the applicants 
could not demonstrate individual concern given that they were members of an 
open category of people. Advocate General Jacobs proposed a new test that 
would render an applicant individually concerned where a EU measure ‘has or is 
liable to have, a substantial adverse effect on his interests’.38 He thus shifted the 
focus from a formalistic test to one based on the economic impact of the EU 
measure.39 The core of Advocate General Jacobs’s Opinion was the stance that 
it is not automatic that a private applicant who does not have locus standi to bring 
an annulment action can always obtain a remedy by bringing an action before a 
national court that will then make a reference on validity to the Court: the 
national court may simply decide not to do so.40 
 The General Court followed Advocate General Jacobs’s Opinion in Jégo-
Quéré v Commission and proposed a further relaxation of the Plaumann formula. In 
Jégo-Quéré, the General Court stated that:  
[I]n order to ensure effective judicial protection for individuals, a 
natural or legal person is to be regarded as individually concerned 
by a Community measure of general application that concerns 
him directly if the measure in question affects his legal position, 
in a manner which is both definite and immediate, by restricting 
his rights or by imposing obligations on him. The number and 
																																																																																																																					
‘Judicial Review as a Contribution to the Development of European Constitutionalism’ 
(2003) 22 Yearbook of European Law 1.  
36 Josephine Steiner and Lorna Woods, EU Law (10th edn, OUP 2009), 294-95. 
37 Case C-358/89 Extramet [1991] ECR I-02501, Opinion of AG Jacobs, paras. 70-74. 
38 Case C-50/00 Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council [2002] ECR I-6677, Opinion of 
AG Jacobs, paras. 60, 103. 
39 Catherine Barnard and Steve Peers (eds), European Union Law (OUP 2014) 274. 
40 Case C-50/00 UPA [2002] ECR I-6677, Opinion of AG Jacobs, paras. 36-49.  
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position of other persons who are likewise affected by the 
measure, or who may be so, are of no relevance in that regard.41  
Unfortunately, when UPA came before the Court, it chose not to follow 
Advocate General Jacobs’s advice, but instead to insist on the Plaumann test.42 
The Court also overturned the General Court’s ruling in Jégo-Quéré on appeal.43 
In both cases, it stated that any potential reform must come from the Member 
States themselves instead of the Court.44 It should be noted, though, that in 
its Report to the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference (May 1995) preceding the 
adoption of the Amsterdam Treaty,45 the Court expressed its own doubts about 
the present law on standing: 
It may be asked ...) whether the right to bring an action for 
annulment under Article 173 [later 230] of the EC Treaty, which 
individuals enjoy only in regard to acts of direct and individual 
concern, is sufficient to guarantee for them effective judicial 
protection against possible infringements of their fundamental 
rights arising from the legislative activity of the institutions.  
However, amendments to the wording of the Treaty provision concerning 
the annulment procedure were only made nine years later with the adoption of 
the Lisbon Treaty and the new Article 263 TFEU.  
 
III. POST-LISBON SITUATION 
 
A New Article 263 TFEU 
 
The Lisbon Treaty finally succeeded in modifying the original standing rules 
applicable to natural or legal persons. By adopting the wording of Article III-365 
of the ill-fated Constitutional Treaty,46 the Lisbon Treaty introduced two 
amendments to the old Article 230 EC. Firstly, Article 263(4) TFEU states that 
	
	
41 Case T-177/01 Jégo-Quéré & Cie SA v Commission [2002] ECR II-2365, para. 51. 
42 Case C-50/00 Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council [2002] ECR I-6677. 
43 Case C-263/02 Commission v Jégo-Quéré & Cie SA [2004] ECR I-3425, paras. 29-39. 
44 ibid para 31; Case C-50/00 Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council [2002] ECR I-6677, 
para. 45. 
45 Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties 
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts [1997] OJ C340/01. 
46 Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe [2004] OJ C310. 
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‘any natural or legal person may ... institute proceedings against an act addressed 
to that person or which is of direct and individual concern to them’, thus 
replacing the old formulation according to which individuals were able to 
challenge a decision addressed to them or a decision, ‘which, although in the form 
of a regulation’ was of direct and individual concern to them. This amendment 
can be seen as the result of a yearlong court practice according to which, as was 
noted above, the test of direct and individual concern was also used to test the 
legality of regulations and directives.47 In addition, the amendment removed the 
requirement of individual concern for regulatory acts that are of direct concern 
and do not entail implementing measures. In order to assess the significance of 
this amendment, the terms ‘regulatory act’ and ‘implementing measure’ need to 
be analysed.  
 
Regulatory Act 
 
Initially, the meaning of the term ‘regulatory act’ was unclear. While the TFEU 
makes a clear distinction between legislative and non-legislative acts, with 
legislative acts comprising regulations, directives and decisions,48 and non-
legislative acts being delegated and implementing acts,49 the Treaty does not 
provide any definition of the term ‘regulatory act’. In the absence of case law on 
the matter, the Future of Europe Convention that preceded the failed 
Constitutional Treaty provided some guidelines. The Final Report of the 
Discussion Circle, in discussing the standing requirements for natural or legal 
persons, expressed the view that the words ‘a regulatory act’ should be inserted 
into the new article, which would distinguish ‘legislative’ from ‘regulatory’ acts 
and adopt a ‘more open’ approach towards private individuals who challenge 
regulatory acts.50  
 While the Final Report suggests that regulatory acts were intended to mean 
the same as non-legislative acts, it was non-binding and in any case concerned 
the Constitutional Treaty rather than the Lisbon Treaty. It was only after case 
law on the matter that the meaning of the term was settled.  
 
	
	
47 Case C-309/89 Cordoniu v Council [1994] ECR I-1853; Case C-10/95 Asocarne v Council 
and Commission [1995] ECR I-4149; Case T-420/05 Vischim v Commission [2009] ECR II-
03911. 
48 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Art. 289. 
49 ibid Arts. 290-91. 
50 The European Convention Secretariat, Final Report of the Discussion Circle on the Court of 
Justice, Convention 636/03. 
2017] LSE LAW REVIEW  
	
	
113 
Inuit I & II 
 
The first opportunity for the General Court to interpret the meaning of the 
words ‘regulatory act’ arose in Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v European 
Parliament and Council (Inuit I),51 followed by Microban v Commission. 52 
 In Inuit I, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, an association representing Canadian 
Inuits and a number of other companies involved in the manufacturing of seal 
products, filed an action for annulment against a Parliament and Council 
regulation – adopted under the ordinary legislative procedure – which imposed 
restrictions on the import of these products into the EU. The applicants claimed 
that the regulation in question was to be regarded as a regulatory act, and that 
there was therefore no need to show individual concern. The General Court 
however, referring to the drafting history of the Constitutional Treaty,53 defined 
a ‘regulatory act’ as an act ‘of general application apart from legislative acts’.54 It 
follows that the term is applicable only to non-legislative acts, for example (but 
not exclusively) general implementing and delegated acts covered by Articles 
290 and 291 TFEU. On the other hand, legislative acts (regulations, directives 
and decisions) do not fall within this definition and are subject not only the test 
of direct concern but also to the stricter Plaumann test of individual concern.55 
 As the act challenged in Inuit I was a legislative regulation, the General 
Court concluded that the general standing test (direct and individual concern) 
had to be applied. The result was that the applicants were denied locus standi, due 
mostly to the fact that they failed to pass the Plaumann test.  
 The General Court’s decision in Inuit I was appealed before the Court of 
Justice in Inuit II,56 however the Court confirmed the lower court’s 
interpretation of ‘regulatory act’. It stated that ‘the concept of “regulatory act” 
provided for in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU does not encompass 
legislative acts.’57 The Court also held that the new Treaty provision was in line 
with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 
	
	
51 Case T-18/10 Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami & Others v. European Parliament & Council [2011] 
ECR 11-05599. 
52 Case T-262/10 Microban v. Commission [2011] ECR 11-07697. 
53 Case T-18/10 Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami & Others v. European Parliament & Council [2011] 
ECR 11-05599, para. 50. 
54 ibid para. 56. 
55 Catherine Barnard and Steve Peers (eds) (n 40) 276. 
56 Case C-583/11 Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami v Parliament and Council [2013] ECR 
EU:C:2013:625. 
57 ibid para. 61. 
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thus providing a complete system of legal protection based on a combination of 
Articles 263 and 267 TFEU.58 In addition, it ruled that the test for direct 
concern remained unchanged post-Lisbon by overruling the General Court’s 
attempt to restrictively interpret this requirement.59  
 
Microban v Commission 
 
Several weeks after it had determined the scope of ‘regulatory act’ in Inuit I, the 
General Court delivered its decision in Microban v Commission.60 This was the first 
judgment in which the Lisbon Treaty exception was fully satisfied in a situation 
where the applicant would otherwise not have passed the general test of 
standing due to lack of individual concern.  In Microban, an American producer 
of antibacterial additives brought an action for annulment against a Commission 
decision addressed to the Member States. The decision removed triclosan, a 
chemical substance, from the list of additives that could be used in the 
manufacture of plastics intended for the packaging of food products, which had 
been summed up in a previous Commission directive. The decision in question 
was an implementing act.  
Applying Inuit, the General Court found that the Commission decision was 
(a) a non-legislative act of general application and thus a regulatory act and (b) 
of direct concern to the applicant as it directly affected the applicant’s legal 
status, and clearly no discretion over its implementation was left to the Member 
States since it imposed a direct prohibition on the use of triclosan. It then 
addressed the issue of direct concern by emphasising that the interpretation of 
direct concern under the Lisbon Treaty would remain the same as pre-Lisbon.61 
Finally, the Court recognised the applicant’s standing and annulled the 
Commission decision on the grounds that it had no legal basis and that it 
breached a procedural requirement.62 
 Although the judgment in Microban demonstrated how the new test 
developed under the Lisbon Treaty could benefit natural or legal persons, it did 
little to clarify the meaning of the injunction that the regulatory act must ‘not 
entail implementing measures’. However, it did not take long before the courts 
interpreted this requirement as well.  
	
	
58 ibid paras. 48-51. 
59 ibid paras. 64, 66. 
60 Case T-262/10 Microban v. Commission [2011] ECR 11-07697. 
61 ibid paras. 21-32. 
62 ibid para. 69. 
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Implementing Measures 
 
In reading Article 263(4) TFEU, it is clear that even if the impugned act can be 
categorised as a regulatory act, if implementing measures are present, then the 
exception will not apply and the applicant will again need to resort to the 
Plaumann formula.63 Three recent cases elucidate the meaning  of ‘implementing 
measures’.  
 
Palirria Soulioits v Commission 
 
In Palirria Souliotis v Commission, the General Court held that the direct concern 
test referring to the absence of the addressee’s discretion is different from the 
requirement set in Article 263(4) TFEU that the regulatory act in question 
cannot entail implementing measures.64 This would form the starting point for 
the judgments in the following two cases. 
 
Telefónica v Commission 
 
The Telefónica v Commission case was the first to shed light on the meaning of the 
expression ‘implementing measures’.65 The case concerned a Commission 
decision declaring that a Spanish financial aid scheme constituted illegal state 
aid. The Spanish government was required to recover the aid that was 
incompatible with the common market, and Telefónica SA, a company which 
had profited from the scheme, filed an action for annulment against the 
Commission’s decision.  
In its ruling, the Court stated that the question whether a regulatory act 
entails implementing measures should be assessed by reference to the position 
of the person invoking the right to bring proceedings under Article 263(4) 
TFEU. It was irrelevant whether the impugned act entailed implementing 
	
	
63 Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca (n 3) 530. 
64 Case T-380/11 Palirria Souliotis v Commission [2013] ECR EU:T:2013:420, para. 44. 
65 Case C-274/12 P Telefónica SA v Commission [2013] ECR EU:C:2013:852. 
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measures ‘with regard to other persons’.66 The Court went on to explain that 
when determining whether the measure in question entails implementing 
measures, reference should be made solely to the subject matter of the 
annulment action, and where only partial annulment of an act is sought, only the 
implementing measures which that specific part entails must be taken into 
account.67 The Court made clear that the absence of implementing measures 
equals the absence of any measure to be taken by the addressee of the measure 
(that is, the Member State) that could generate ‘specific consequences’ for the 
applicant.68 
 Ultimately, the Court rejected the application on the ground that the 
contested decision entailed implementing measures in Spain with regard to 
Telefónica SA.69 Specifically, the contested decision simply declared the financial 
scheme in question to be inconsonant with the common market and did not 
contain any ‘specific consequences’ for each taxpayer. Those consequences had 
to be embodied in several administrative documents, which constituted 
‘implementing measures’ as codified in Article 263(4) TFEU.70 
 The Court highlighted that even though in this case, action under Article 
263 TFEU was not possible, the applicant could still bring the contested 
decision before a national court, which could then start a preliminary ruling 
procedure pursuant to Article 267 TFEU.71 
 
T & L Sugars v Commission 
 
Most recently, in April 2015, the Court in T & L Sugars and Sidul Açúcares v 
Commission provided further clarification as to the expression ‘an act which does 
not contain implementing measures’.72 The applicants in this case were a group 
of cane sugar refiners established in the EU. In order to increase the sugar 
supply to the EU market (which was experiencing a shortage at the time), the 
Commission adopted several regulations. The purpose of these measures was (i) 
to allow European Union producers to market a limited quantity of sugar in 
excess of the domestic production quota, and (ii) to introduce a tariff quota 
	
	
66 ibid para 30. 
67 ibid para 31. 
68 ibid para 35; Catherine Barnard and Steve Peers (eds) (n 40) 277. 
69 Case C-274/12 Telefónica SA v Commission [2013] ECR EU:C:2013:852, para. 58. 
70 ibid para 35. 
71 ibid para 59. 
72 Case C-456/13 T & L Sugars and Sidul Açúcares v Commission [2015] ECR 
EU:C:2015:284. 
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allowing economic operators concerned to import certain quantities of sugar 
without having to pay import duties. The applicants were negatively affected by 
these regulations and filed an action for annulment before the General Court. 
As it was clear to the applicants that it would be impossible to prove individual 
concern, they sought to challenge the regulations on the basis of direct concern, 
which involved showing that the regulatory acts in question entailed no 
implementing measures. The General Court declared the action for annulment 
inadmissible.73 On appeal, the applicants submitted that the Commission 
determined every detail of the contested regulations, while the Member States 
functioned merely as ‘mail boxes’. According to the applicants, the General 
Court erred when holding that even ‘automatic’ or ‘merely ancillary’ measures 
adopted by Member States under a EU regulation constitute decisions 
‘implementing’ that regulation. They asserted that the existence of discretion 
should be taken into account when determining whether a Member State 
measure taken under the EU act in fact adds anything to that act.74 
 The Court of Justice upheld the General Court’s decision. It first reiterated 
its reasoning from Telefónica by stating that when determining whether a 
regulatory act entails implementing measures, reference should be had to the 
position of the applicant, and that it is irrelevant whether the act contains 
implementing measures with regard to others.75 It then found that the regulatory 
acts in question only produced legal effects vis-à-vis the applicants through the 
intermediary of acts taken by the national authorities. In this case, the 
regulations in question required the applicants to apply for certain certificates, 
and according to the Court, the decisions of national authorities in granting or 
denying such certificates constituted implementing measures within the meaning 
of Article 263(4) TFEU. The Court emphasised that the ‘mechanical’ nature of 
the required measures at national level did not call such a conclusion into 
question.76 As in Telefónica, the Court noted that the route of Article 267 TFEU 
remained open to the applicants.77 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
When the new Article 263(4) TFEU was enacted under the Lisbon Treaty, its 
	
	
73 ibid paras. 4-12. 
74 ibid paras. 18-20. 
75 ibid para. 32. 
76 ibid paras. 40-41. 
77 ibid paras. 40-41. 
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practical implications for natural or legal persons were unclear. Pre-Lisbon, the 
Court had developed a clear pattern of case law where, in order to be admissible 
before the Court, applicants filing an annulment procedure had to comply with 
the requirements of direct concern and the strict Plaumann formula establishing 
individual concern. By being highly restrictive, the Plaumann test rendered it 
practically impossible for many private parties to be admissible before the 
Court. The criticism that this formula triggered led to the adoption of a new 
article under the Lisbon Treaty, which removed the requirement of individual 
concern for regulatory acts that are of direct concern and do not entail 
implementing measures. In order for an act not to have to pass the Plaumann 
test, it is therefore essential that it is both of a regulatory nature and that it does 
not contain any implementing measures – if one of these two requirements is 
not satisfied, individual concern will have to be proven after all.   
The meaning of the term ‘regulatory act’ was clarified in Inuit and Microban. 
It is now clear that it encompasses acts of general application apart from 
legislative acts, thus excluding legislative acts (directives, regulations and 
decisions enacted according to the ordinary legislative procedure) from its 
coverage. Telefónica and S & L Sugars further explained the meaning of the 
expression ‘act which does not contain implementing measures’. It is now clear 
that the question whether a regulatory act entails implementing measures should 
be assessed exclusively by reference to the subject matter of the annulment 
action and the person using the right to bring these proceedings under Article 
263(4) TFEU. The requirement of absence of implementing measures equals the 
absence of any implementing measures taken by Member States, meaning that 
even measures that are automatic or merely ancillary will fall under this 
definition.  
Thus, Article 263 TFEU now entails two standing tests: the ‘general 
standing test’ for legislative acts where applicants have to prove direct and 
individual concern, and the ‘Lisbon test’ of direct concern for regulatory acts 
that do not contain implementing measures.  
It can be concluded that the Lisbon Treaty has made it easier for natural or 
legal persons to challenge non-legislative acts of general application. This means 
that private parties will now have more chances to successfully challenge 
measures of the Commission that were enacted in cases where the Parliament 
does not exercise its direct democratic power. The Microban case provides a 
good example in this respect. However, as Telefónica and S & L Sugars have 
shown, applicants wishing to subject regulatory acts to judicial review will also 
have to prove that no implementing measures took place in Member States, 
which can sometimes be harder than expected. Nothing, however, has changed 
with regard to acts adopted under the ordinary legislative procedure, as when it 
comes to these measures, the Plaumann formula has remained in force. To that 
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end, natural or legal persons who have been significantly affected by such 
legislative measures and have good reasons for questioning their legality, will in 
most cases not be able to file annulment actions for the sole reason that they are 
unable to satisfy the strict test of individual concern. It remains to be seen 
whether any future treaty will bring change in this respect. 
